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Executiye suinmarv 
1.  The transition from Soviet Socialist Republics to modem, independent nation states is proving a difficult 
one  for  Central  Asia.  The five  republics'  ability  to maximise  the  benefits  from  their  rich  natural 
resources will be crucial for this transition. 
2.  The  EU  bas  important  interests  in.  Central  Asia.  These arc  both  geopolitical  and  economic.  The 
development of  the energy sector is particularly important to the Union, which is both a major potential 
consumer of  enelJY products and a supplier of  investment capital, services and equipment. 
3.  The Union's prime objective is maintenance of  ~ility  in the region. This can best b~chi_;ved  through: 
•  the evolution of  broadly-based, representative, democratic institutions; 
•  the reduction of  the scope for conflict; 
•  the continuing promotion of  economic refonn. 
The EU should also sedc to improve its own economic security through a greater role in decision-making 
in the energy and mineral extraction sectors. 
4.  The achievement of  these objectives will be a long-term process. It is important, if the EU is successfully 
to pursue  them,  that  it  raise  its  profile  throughout  the  region.  This  does  not  imply  that the  same 
instruments arc appropriate in each case : these should reflect the very different circumstances in the five 
republics. They should include the following: 
Economic Cooperation and Assistance 
a)  With Kyrgyzstan, the PCA should be ratified and the Interim Agreement signed as soon as possible. 
With  Kazakhstan,  implementation  will  need  to  await  ratification,  currently  stalled  due  to  the 
President's suspension of Parliament.  This  need  not,  however,  prevent the  negotiation of sectoral 
agreements e.g. on steel and trade in nuclear materials. 
b)  Subject  to . the  outcome  of needs  assessment,  any  new  food  aid  operation  could  again  include 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
c)  Tacis operations should continue in all  five  republics.  These should  include the  intensification of 
activities under the Democracy Programme. 
d)  ECHO  should  continue  to provide  humanitarian  assistance  to certain  COWltrics  of Central  Asia, 
subject to needs. 
New contractual relations 
While it  would  be  in the  EU's economic and security interests to establish a more  regular dialogue with 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, it must be recognised that the EU's political conditionality· for negotiating a 
PCA (i.e.  the principles expressed in the CSCE documents)  is  unlikely  to be  met  in_  the  short term.  A 
regular dialogue will  enable the partners concerned to measure the progress  in  meetins  th~ political and 
economic conditions the European Union attachea to negotiating and concluding a PCA. 
The EU should therefore initiate a regular political dialogue.  This would,  on  the  one  hand,  address the 
Union's overall political concerns and on the other, ·take the form of  exploratory discussions in which the EU 
could  explain the criteria it would  expect to be  met  by  PCA  partners.  The  EU  would  make  clear  its 
intention to negotiate full PCAs once sufficient progress has been achieved. 
2 This dialogue would, perforce, have to be of an informal nature, in that it could not take place within an 
institutional framework.  In parallel, formal contacts should continue on economic questions, based on the 
1989 Agreement and, as appropriate, sectoral trade agreements. 
Political and diplomatic relations 
The PCAs  and  the dialogue with  Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan would  also be the principal  vehicles  for 
promoting the EU's objectives.  But there should also be a possibility for such dialogue at regional level. 
The  Union  should  use  its  influence  to support the efforts of the  UN  and  the  OSCE  to  maintain  the 
momentum of  the Intcr-Tajik peace process. 
Political issues affeCting Central Asia, including Tajikistan and access to energy, should be discussed as 
part of ongoing political contacts with  Russia, Turkey and Pakistan,  both bilaterally and  in  multilateral 
fora.  The EC should also streugthen its relations with the Economic Cooperation Organisation. 
The Commission will consider the possibility of ~g  its diplomatic representatiolin the region, 
budgetary means permitting. 
5.  A number of  measures referred to above (notably in the field of  political cooperation, support for 
democratic institutions and possibly some fields of  assistance) could be the object of  a Common 
Position.  A draft Common Position is presented in conjunction with this Communication. 
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3 Introduction 
THE EU'S RELATIONS WllH Tftl NEWLY INDEPENPENT STATES 
or  CENTRAL ASIA 
1.  The  remoteness  of Central Asia has not prevented its emergence as a region  of importance to  the 
European Union. Exploitation of  the huge oil and gas reseiVes in the Eastern Caspian and Northern 
Kazakhstan became a. practical possibility only after the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the region 
is also a major supplier of uranium and other minerals. Competition for economic influence there is 
likely to intensify, provided that the present relative stability in the republics other than Tajikistan can 
be maintained.  But for the five· countries of the region 1,  the  transition from  relatively  poor Soviet 
Socialist Republics to potentially wealthy modem nation States is proving,  for differing  reasons,  a 
difficult  one.  The  Presidents  of the  three  energy-rich  republics  (Kazakhstan,  Turkmenistan  and 
Uzbekistan)  are all fanner CPSU Politburo incmbers, and  in  varying degrees  afey  iiave opted for 
strong (indeed authoritarian) government as the antidote to the fissile  tendencies which characterise 
the region. h also remains to be seen whether the fiv~.  republics will continue to view their interests as 
compatible with Moscow's conception of  its long tenn role, a role which is already under challenge in 
Tajikistan. 
2.  The EU is already a significant actor on the Central Asian scene. For the energy producers it remains 
for  the  moment  their  single most  important market outside  the  CIS  ~  it  is  also  a  very  important 
supplier  of the  capital,  know-how,  goods  and  seiVices  required  to  realise  their  potential.  For 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, it is an important aid donor. It was the EC and its Member States which 
took the first significant initiatives to create an international framework  for  the  republics' eventual 
integration into the global economy; the European Energy Charter, the EBRD and the negotiation of 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  It now needs to 
decide whether to negotiate with  Uzbekistan - which  bas  requested  an ambitious  PCA  - and with 
Turkmenistan.  The General Affairs Council of 4 October 1994 considered this question and called 
for  reports on the human  rights  situation in both these countries;  these were drawn  up  under the 
Gennan Presidency.  The GAC also decided that the situation· in Tajikistan was still too unstable for 
new contractual relations to be envisaged.  -
Following  the  dissolution  of Kazakhstan's  Parliament,  the  European  Parliament  adopted,  on 
S/4/1995, a  resolution that the PCA negotiated  with that country should not  receive  assent until  a 
return to parliamentary democracy is assured. 
3.  The purpose of  this Communication is to consider : 
- how the Union's interests in the region should be defined; 
- the prospects for successful implementation of  PCAs; 
- how the Union might integrate its policy on PCAs into the general context of  its relations 
with these countries; 
- how far a global approach towards Central Asia could be developed, given the wide 
divergences between the Republics in  this vast region, where Kazakhstan alone is nearly 
as large as the lS Member States put together. 
1 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
.  .  4 The situation of the five republics 
4.  Politica/llrunum rights situation 
4.1  The Central Asian republics have a number of political characteristics in .common.  In all  cases the 
sense of  national identity remains weak:  they arc ethnically diverse, with arbitrary borders drawn up 
in the Soviet era for which little historical justification exists.  Amongst some ethnic groups strong 
regional or tribal affiliations exist. All have highly centralised power structures, but the fabric of  state 
and government remains weak. 
4.2  The  EU  has  serious  political  concerns  over  hWIWl  rights  and  democracy  throughout  the  region. 
Those concerning Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were examined in detail in the report compiled under 
the Gennan Presidency (see below).  In addition: 
a)  In Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, referenda have been held to extend Presidential rule 
to the end of  the century, so circumventing the principle of  regular elections. 
-""  b)  In all the republics except Kyrgyzstan there have been concerns about the manner' in which both 
elections and referenda have been held.  In each case, the government has  been supported  by more 
than  95% of the electorate.  Because of these concerns the  EU  declined to  send  observers  for  the 
Parliamentary elections in Uzbekistan last December and in TajikiSf:an in February  1995, nor for the 
referendum in Kazakhstan held in April. 
c)  President Nazarbayev's suspension of Parliament, followed  by what appears to  be  reluctance to 
hold new elections, has led to fears  over the future of  Parliamentary democracy in Kazakhstan. 
d)  continuing hWIWl rights violations are reported in Tajikistan, which is still in a conflict situation. 
e)  inadequate law enforcement, by an independent judiciary, remains a major problem. 
4.3  A report on human rights  in  Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan was  compiled at the  Council's  request 
during the German Presidency, based on the contributions of Member States' Heads of Mission and 
the Commission.  This noted that: 
•  in  Uzbekistan, there is a gap between the guarantees offered by the constitution and their practical 
implementation.  In particular, the police and the security services appear to have few constraints on 
their activities;  the press  is  not free;  political demonstrations  have been suppressed;  and  human 
rights  violations by state authorities have often escaped judicial control.  But the nwnber of brutal 
assaults against members of the opposition has  reduced,  even if incidents continue to occur.  The 
rights  of minorities  are  largely  respected.  President  Karimov's  amnesty  of November  1994  is 
regarded as evidence of a will to demonstrate good intentions in the fields of human rights, as is the 
governmenes interest in the establishment of  the OSCE office in Tashkent. 
•  Turkmenistan has made only limited progress in moving from a Soviet-era style of  government to a 
democratic system. Opposition parties do not exist and there is a growing personality cult around the 
President, who has centred his nation-building efforts around the revival ofTurkrnen nationalism.  On 
several occasions the government has detained individuals who have criticised it.  The President has 
power'to select and to dismiss judges.  Again, a gap exists between constitutional freedoms, including 
respect for civil  liberties,  and  current practice.  Freedom of speech  and  of ass~bry are  severely 
restricted and the media are controlled by the government.  The report concludes however that despite 
these criticisms Turkmenistan is not a brutal and oppressive police state on the classical model. 
The report comments that the human rights situation in both countries should, arid can, be improved: 
the  Presidency's  view was  that  the  best  way  of helping  these  countries  to  move  towards  closer 
5 adherence to established human rights standards is closer cooperation with the EU,  in the eontext of 
the political dialogue foreseen in PCAs. 
5  Economic clrcumstances 
These vary substantially (see annex A).  Tajikistan is dc;)lninated by the war and its economy is in a 
state of  dislocation worse than that faced by any other NIS.  Despite this, some trade is taking place 
(in  the  EU's  case,  more  than with  Kyrgyzstan)  and  even  some  investment,  essentially  in  mining 
operations. Goldmines also feature among Eurq)ean investments in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan;  but 
here  the  similarity  ends.  Kvrgyzstan  has  from  the  start  followed  the  recommendations  of the 
international  financing  institutions.  It  left  the  rouble  zone  early  and  now  has  a  credible 
macroeconomic policy and sound external finances.  Internally, production continues to fall  sharply 
and  the  country  is  still  &cing  shoJ1ales  of essential  conunodities,  notably  grain  and  energy. 
Uzbekistan's economic perfonnance, based on its mineral wealth and high quality cotton production, 
seems almost resilient,  in comparison with the other republics, despite a very slow start on  reform 
and continuing high levels of  inflation.  The latest government plan, unveiled in February 1995, calls 
for a major boost to privatisation.  K•qkbstan has belatedly taken measures to protect its currency 
and  cut inflation down to reasonable levels,  but 1994 economic indicators still..fumb' p()int  in  the 
wrong direction.  The President's impatience with the failure to press ahead with refoim policies led 
to the replacement of the Tereshchenko government and  probably  played a part in  his  decision  to 
suspend a parliament one third of  whose members he-had himself nominated.  Turkmenistan is one of 
the  world's  largest suppliers of natural gas.  Its  external  trade  is ·in  surplus;  but the country  is 
experiencing serious problems  with securing repayment  from NIS  clients  (notably ·Ukraine,  whose 
debt was recently rescheduled, and the Transcaucasian republics). 
In all these countries there is evidence that wealth is being increasingly concentrated in the hands of 
certain  sections  of society  which  have,  in  particular,  been  able  to  profit  from  the  economic 
liberalisation process.  Econori'lic disparities, combined with  inadequate social  "safety nets",  may  if 
unchecked aggravate the inherent instability of  the new nation states. 
6.  Th~  ~nviro~~~Mnt 
All the republics, but in particular those in the Caspian and Aral regions and North-East Kazakhstan 
face  very  severe  environmental  problems.  These  have  been  compounded  by  the  governments' 
inability, so far,  to define a realistic framework  for cooperation, e.g.  with regard to the Aral _Sea. 
Furthermore,  in  the  Semipalatinsk  region  some  damage  has  been  created  by  nuclear  fallout  and 
accidents. 
7.  Role of  third countrks in Central A.sia 
7  .I  Although  metals,  including  uranium,  coal  and  cotton  are  among  the  conunodities  the  republics 
produce,  their  geopolitical  significance  is  linked  above  all  to  the  importance  of Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and (to a lesser extent) Uzbekistan as hydrocarbons producers.  This is an important 
element  in the  region's  complex  relationship  with  Russia,  for  whom  the  participation of Russian 
companies in exploration and exiraction, and the route of new oil and gas pipelines, are a matter of 
political  as  well  u  economic  importance.  This  is  particularly  the  case  regarding  outlets  for 
Kazakhstan's oil and gas production and Turkmenistan's plans to build a gas pipeline to link up with 
Iran's network.  The solutions finally adopted for the pipelines will  be crucial for the  future of the · 
major foreign investment in the energy sector, and so for these countries' future prosperity.  Russia's 
role  is  pelVasive in other ways:  Uzbek and Kaza1ch troops are supporting the  Russian military  in 
Tajikistan;  ethnic Russians dominate Turkmenistan's officer corps.  There is evidepce,nowever, that 
neither  Uzbekistan  nor Turkmenistan would  welcome too  much  strengthening of Russia's  military 
role in the region.  Russia's continuing military role as "guardian" of  the CIS's southern frontier, and. 
developments in the conflicts in Tajikistan and indeed Afghanistan, will be key to the Central Asian 
republics' efforts to reorient their trade towards the South and China.  In the long run, their economic 
independence could depend upon their success in doing so. 
6 1be relationships of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with Russia go much deeper, given the numbers of 
ethnic Russian citizens and their economic importance, especially along Kazakhstan's  long Northern 
border.  In Kazakhstan's energy-rich North-West communications, and economic links generally, are 
with  neighbouring oblasts in Russia rather than  far-off Almaty.  Moreover,  emigration  by  ethnic 
Russians is reacrung unprecedented levels ; this  wiD  prove extremely damaging to both Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan. Hence President Nazarbaev's call- despite his concerns over nationalism in Russia 
and  his  anger over the ending of the rouble zone  -'for a "Euro-asiatic Union"  and his  decision to 
establish a "Customs Union" with Russia and Belarus.  Kyrgyzstan is participating in discussions on 
joining this Customs Union.  It is not clear wbetbcr the "Central Asian Conunon Market" formed in 
February  1994  by Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan and UZbekistan is  compatible with this process or can 
indeed survive it.  ·  · 
7.2  Central Asia featu~ higher on the United States' agenda than on those of either Europe or Japan. 
This high profile - reflected in the visits to the resion paid by Vice-President Gore, Secretary of  State 
Christopher  and  Defense·  Secretary  Perry  - is  linked  to  both  political  and  economic  objectives. 
Washington  has  cooperated  closely  with  Kazakhstan  011  denuclearisation  and  clearly  regards 
President Nazarbacv as a key figure  in easunna regional stability, the political inde~ce  of the 
newly  independent states and freedom of action for  US  oil and gas companies. ""'Thl US  was thus 
particularly disappointed.  as  was  the EU,  by Nazarbaev's  recent actions.  The  US  has expressed 
similar concerns to those of  the EU concerning human rights and democracy in Uzbekistan, but this 
has not prevented them from concluding trade and investmeot ag~ent  with this country.  The US 
has  been  particularly  prominent  in  supporting  Kyrgyzstan's  reforms.  Like  the  EU,  it regards 
Kyrgyzstan as a possible model for the region. 
7.3  Turkey has  also sought to play a major role in Central Asia,  notably promoting Turkish cultural 
links and economic and military cooperation.  But its remoteness, and its limited capacity as a donor, 
have  reduced  the  impact of Turkish activities.  China too has  sought to expand its  influence,  in 
particular through trade.  Premier Li Peng visited Central Asia in summer  1994 in order to promote 
closer  relations.  However,  traditional  hostility  towards  China,  where  sinification  policies  have 
created  fears  for  the  futures  of the  Kazakh  and  Kyrgyz  minorities  there  (and of the  Uighurs  of 
Sinkiang, who are ethnically close to the Uzbeks), will act as a brake on the development of relations. 
That hostility has been sharpened by China's resumption of nuclear testing at the Lop Nor range j.n 
Sinkiang.  Finally Iran, Pakistan and India are also interested in closer cooperation, but apart from 
the  development  of certain communications  projects  links  slow progress  has  been  made:  the one 
exception - and it is an important one - being the planned gas pipe line from Turkmerustan to Iran 
referred  to  above.  Central  Asian  governments'  concerns  over  Islamic  radicalism.  poor 
communi~tions  and the effects of  the Afghan and Tajik conflicts are the main reasons for this. 
7.4  As a potential trading partner, source of  investment and donor, the EU ranks well ahead of other third 
countries.  But so  far,  only  Uzbekistan  has  understood  Europe's  potential  as  a  political  partner. 
Kazakhstan's  preoccupation  with  Russia  and  the  US,  and ·Turkmenistan's  with  Russia  and  Iran, 
should be a matter of concern ~  European ·players who have their own,  important, interests in the 
region. 
8,  The EU's interests and role hitherto 
8.1  Already in  its  working paper of Februaty 1994  2 the Commission put forward the view that even 
though  Russia will  for the time  being continue to dominate  the  region,  there  ~I  be  competition 
between the EU, other Western partners and the region's neighbours to exercise cp>qbmic influence 
there.  It  noted  that the  republics  will  need  time  to  realise  their. potential  and  that  infrastructure 
investment  will  be  essential for  this~  and  it concluded that the EU  has  an interest.  over time,  il} 
encouraging  investors  to enter these  markets  and  in  providing  services  and  equipment.  The EU, 
2 "The EU's future contractual relations with the NIS of the former Soviet Union : an assessment of strategy" (SEC 
(94) 258 of 10.02.1994). 
7 ualike Russia, US  aad Iran, also bu u  iD1rn1t as a major potential conswner of energy products 
from  the  region.  aDd  especially of DltW'al pa:  at present  near to 50%3  of its  consumption  of 
importtd gas is of RussiaD oriaia.  ancl if  tbrecuts are accurate a growing share of our domestic 
demand will,  within the  foreleeable  tUture.  be coveted by  imports.  The EU  is  also an  important 
conswner of uranium  - produced  by all tbe  Ceatra1  Asian  republics,  except Turkmenistan  - and 
Pf0P01CS to negotiate sectoral trade aareemeats with them. Oil from the KazaJch fields is expected to 
start flowing  westwards  from  1997.  Gas  may flow  through Turkey and  Iran.  It  is  in  the  EUs 
interest to ensure that its voice is beard in "'Itten concerning extraction, pipeline routes and on the 
laue of  jurisdiction in tho Cupian Sea. 
8.2  Apart from these geopolitical and ~  iate~Ss. Central Asia represents a not insignificant 
market of  52 mn c:oasurnen situated utricle tile land routes between Europe and the markets of the 
Far East and the Indian subcontinent.  Oftbele, 17 mn live in Kazakhstan and 22 mn in Uzbekistan, 
the traditional cultural and ecoaomic heart oftbe qion. 
8.3  The Union's security  interest~ are abov. allliabd to the (as yet hypothetical) dangers of increased 
instability in the reaioo· Tbele JO wider tiiiD. tbe lou of  marktJts and damage to  _!U iftvestments.  In 
ecoaomic terma. acc:eu to resources nay  in tbe laDa term prove to be a yet more significant factor. In 
geopolitical terms, the emerpac:e of rib betwecD ethnic, clan or regional groupings· could  lead to 
conflicts such as has occurred in Tajikistan becaming more widespread, bringing. with  it the risk of 
outside  involvement  and  ultimately  the  ~ty  of confrontation  involving  Russia  and  third 
countries. 
The EU also has sec:Urity concerns relatiq both to the production and marketing of nuclear materials 
and to the growing drugs problem in the republic~ of South-But Central Asia. 
8.4  EiDalllt, it  should be noted that delpite hiP leYell of  emipation, there remain substantial numbers of 
citizals in the five  republics  claimiDa edlllic liDks  with  Member  States. There are believed  to be 
arounci'JUO.OOO  people in Kazakhltaa of Gennan origin and there are also  Greek minorities.  The 
same is true, to a  leuer extalt, of J18iabbourias  countriea.  Instability would  undoubtedly  further 
increuepressures to emiarate and tbe BU would probably be the first choice of  many. 
9.  So far the EC'a acti0111 have been limiced to 1:be fbllowiua fields: 
Contractual.  PCAs have been liped witb Kualchltan ad  Kyrgyzstan.  Pending the entry into force 
of the  new  agreements,  the  19i9 Trade ud Cooperation  Apc:ment with  the  USSR  is  applied 
bilaterally.with each of  the five republica.  1he first Joint Committee, with Uzbekistan, took place on 
12 May under the 1989 Agreement. So tar KaakhltaD. Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have 
signed the Energy Charter Treaty IDd Turkmrlliltan hu announced its intention to foUow suit. 
Food Aid.  Tajikistan  and  Kyrgyzstan  are beDeficiatics  of the  204  MECU  food  aid  operation 
launched by the Commiuion to tide certain NIS over the winter of 1994-95.  The aid accorded to 
them is valued at 20 MECU (Tt;ikistan) llld 19 MECU (Kyrgyzstan).  Deliveries are expected to be 
completecl  in  May  1995.  In  the  fruai'WOik  of the  204  MBCU  operation  ECHO  has  provided 
ernqency aid to Tajikistan (9.8 MBCU) aad Kyrgyzatan (6.2 MECU). 
Technical Aasistaace.  ~the  republits bave benefited from Tacis programmes·(t31.3 MECU to 
· date).  A breakdown ofT  A provided in this way is at Annex B.  The Tacis Democracy Programme 
runs  propunmes in KazakhltaD,  Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.  Tbe  EC  has ..beeit  assisting  the 
process of  economic reintegration on a market basis, throuah the T  ACIS Interstate Programme. 
3 Coopers and Lybrand report prepared for the European Commission, DGXVII. 
IS Financial Assistance.  Loans have been taken up by all the republics under the  1250 MECU facility 
intended to finance imports of  food and medical products.  Some countries have at times been late in 
servicing their debt, but at present only Tajikistan is in arrears (See Annex C). 
Diplomatic.  The  Commission's  first  delegation  in  the  region  began  operations  m  Almaty  m 
November 1994. 
10.  Trade and investment have risen sharply, from a very low base.  Investment figures are not reliable, 
but it appears that the lion's share of  the investment has gone to the energy sector, and to Kazakhstan 
in particular4.  The EU also has an important surplus in merchandise trade with Kazakhstan. and a 
deficit with Uzbekistan;  it also runs a small deficit with Turlancnistan.  Trade with Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan remains at very low levels (see Annex D). 
11.  The EU's objectives 
11.1  Development and consolidation of  democracy and the respect of human rights constitute one of the 
objectives of  the Common Foreign and Security policy of  the EU and are the b8!!J fqr seeurity and 
peace in the region.  Economic development and the construction of a civil  society Which observes 
human rights and the fundamental freedoms are intrinsically linked. 
The  Ells first task  is  to support the evolution of broadly - based,  representative, democratic 
institutions which will allow the republics to reinforce their internal oohesion, ensure their long-term 
viability as natiori states and ·avoid the post-Soviet era being succeeded by a power vacuum with the 
capacity to suck in third countries. 
11.2  The  Union's  second task is  reduce the scope for conflict.  The principal means  of achieving this 
remain the processes of political and economic  reform,  but the Union's  importance as an impartial 
donor and as an investment and trading partner give it greater ability to exercise political influence in 
the region than most others. This abilitY could also be used in support of the UN and the OSCE in 
their efforts to further the peace process in Tajikistan. The 204 MECU food aid operation and the 
work  of ECHO  have  already done  much  to raise the  Ells profile  in  Tajikistan : they  provide an 
important basis for further action. 
11.3  The Union's third task is to continue to promote the process of  economic reform. As elsewhere in the 
former USSR the objective is to work with the international financing institutions and other donors to 
help the partie$ reinforce economic discipline, achieve macrOeconomic stability and liberalise trade 
and  investment.  Economic  reform  shall  be guided  by the  requirements  of sustainability and  shall 
fully incorporated environmental considerations. 
11.4  The Union's  fourth task is to  improve its  own economic security. This would require it to take a 
more active role in decision making both as regards investments in the energy sector and in mining, 
and as regards the routing of  pi~lines, sectors which also have or could have a significant impact on 
the environment and have a crucial role to play in achieving sustainable development, The PCAs and 
the European Energy Charter Treaty provide the legal basis for a dialogue on these issues, and there 
is every advantage in cooperating closely with other investors and with transit countries. Russia falls 
mto both these categories. 
12.  It is  important that in promoting these objectives, the Union should be seen by the governments as 
friendly, impartial, yet not so remote as to be disengaged.  • 
13.  The EU has the capacity to achieve this ; yet for the moment it is seen as a less significant partner. 
than the international institutions, the  United  States, Turkey and (in the case of Kyrgyzstan)  even 
4 Statistics compiled by UN ECE show that, taken over the lifespan of the projects, Kazakhstan accounted for no 
less than 39 %of total foreign direct investment commitments in transition economies by end 1994. 
9 Switzerland. It is essential, if  the EU is to pursue its objectives, for it to raise its profile throughout 
the region. This is one of  the most powerful arguments for the intensification of  political dialogue. 
Instruments 
14.  Even if the above objectives apply on a regional basis, the wide variations which exist between the 
republics  preclude the  use of instruments common to all.  Far more  substantial  progress  towards 
refonn has already been achieved in the case of  Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan than in that of  the other 
three, and notwithstanding concerns over President's Nazarbaev's dissolution of Parliament and the 
extension of his  rule through the 29 April referendum,  these two republics'  policies  remain much 
closer to what the EU would expect from its NIS partners, including the criteria set out in the CSCE 
documents and the PCAs themselves. The instruments at the Elrs disposal could be considered in 
three categories : economic cooperation and assistance ;  new contractual relations ; and political and 
diplomatic relations. 
Economic Cooperation and assistance 
15.1  Kazakhstan and Kvrgyzstan 
These countries' external finances are considered to be in a satisfactory state and they should not find 
it  impossible  to  service  their  financial  commitments.  The  EC's  future  action  will  therefore 
concentrate on implementation of  the PCAs (assuming they are ratified) and the Interim Agreements. 
The PCAs will be complemented by sectoral agreements on trade in steel (Kazakhstan) and nuclear 
materials.  Assistance through Tacis will continue.  It is not yet clear whether a food aid operation on 
the lines of the  1994-95 campaign will in future be needed for Kyrgyzstan as was the case with the 
204 MECU operation;  this will in the first instance depend on the assessment of  the EC/US mission 
which  took place in  May. The EC may need  to consider humanitarian assistance to Kyrgyzstan, 
through ECHO, as it did in 1994. 
15.2  Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
The EC will consider how political relations can be intensified (see below).  No humanitarian actions 
are  envisaged,  and these  countries  too  are expected  to fulfil  their  financial  obligations.  Tacis 
operations will also continue. 
15.3  Tajikistan. 
Following the latest fighting in the Khorog area, the future of  the Teheran cease-fire agreement signed 
in  September  1994 seems doubtful:  it can only be concluded that political circwnstances in this 
country have not yet improved to the point where an upgrading of contractual relations could be 
envisaged,  although a  sectoral agreement on trade in  nuclear materials  is  foreseen.  Tajikistan is 
unlikely to pay outstanding arrears on the interest repayments  on the EC's loan (under the  1250 
MECU facility) in the near future. 
A macro-financial assistance package for Tajikistan is clearly out of  the question.  On the other hand, 
the  Commission proposes to resume previously stalled Tacis activities,  within the  limited finance 
available (expected to be around 4 MECU per annum).  Given that humanitarian concerns persist, 
ECHO's activities in that country will also continue.  The ECIUS  food needs lllissiQn  in May also 
visited Tajikistan;  should it conclude that support will be needed in 1995-6, it would be appropriate 
to include Tajikistan on a similar basis to other areas in need, in particular Transcaucasia, as this W8J! 
the case in the 204 MECU operation. 
15.4  It may be concluded that, with the exception ofthe provision of humanitarian assistance to Tajikistan 
and possibly to Kyrgyzstan, the EC's assistance operations in the foreseeable future in this region will 
10 be limited to ongoing Tacis activities.  These activities could however include an intensification of 
projectS  under  the  Democracy  Programme,  which  should  target  in  particular  Kazakhstan  and 
Uzbekistan : the future of projects in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan will have to be considered in the 
light both ofthe opportunities (the democratic deficit is greater than elsewhere) and of  the obstacles 
to their realisation. 
16.  New contractual relations 
16.1  This  question  is  for  the  moment  limited  to  Uzbekistan  and  Turkmenistan.  The  October  1992 
negotiating nWldatc for PCAs applied to all successor states of  the USSR.  At its first examination of 
the question (General  AffiUrs  Council (GAC) of March  1994) the Council  concluded that "first 
generation" trade and  cooperation agreements similar to the  1989 EC-USSR agreement could be 
negotiated,  but incorporating  investment-related  provisions and  an evolution clause providing  for 
upgrading to full PCA status once conditions (especially regarding human rights) permit.  At the 4 
October GAC, concern over this last point led the Council to adopt a  more reticent approach.  It 
called for a  report on human  rights  by the Presidency,  in  association with the  Commission  and 
Embassies  of the  Member  States  in  the  two  republics,  before  deciding  wSfu~ exploratory 
discussions  shGuld  be  held.  In  parallel  Joint  Committees  could  be  convened  wider  the  1989 
Agreement. 
16.2  That there are concerns over human rights and, more specifically, over the prospects for democracy is 
not questioned.  There must also be serious doubts - given the political circumstances referred to in 
para 3 above - as to whether the EC could in the short term, through a contractual relationship of  any 
sort, induce the two republics to modify their power structure in such a  way as to allow genuine 
political pluralism to take root.  However, as noted in the Commission's paper of February 1994, 
such leverage could eventually develop if  European and other "Western" companies were to establish 
a  significant economic presence there;  and for this to happen  a  close  relationship  with  the two 
governments is a sine qua non.  (NB:  the economic relationship between the EC and Uzbekistan is 
already a significant one.  The value of  trade in 1993 was more than twice that of  the EC's trade with 
all three Transcaucasian republics put together). 
16.3  This contradiction between political and economic objectives in the short tennis also addressed in the 
report on human rights prepared under the Gennan Presidency.  A number of  Western democracies, 
including some member states, have sought to resolve it by establishing bilateral diplo~tic  and trade 
investment relations with Uzbekistan in particular, while also continuing to express concern about 
human rights through diplomatic channels.  Were this  policy to be reflected at European level  it 
would go. in the direction of  the less ambitious trade, cooperation and investment - related agreement 
foreshadowed  in  the  Council's  first  consideration  of the  issue  in  March  1994.  However,  the 
conclusion of full  PCAs with Uzbekistan's two partners in the "Central Asian Common Market", 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, has made it all the more unlikely that that country would be prepared to 
accept discriminatory treatment - especially if  this were formalised in a new agreement to be applied 
for at least ten years. 
16.4  Moreover,· as already noted in the case of  Transcaucasia, any form of new agreement concluded by 
the EC would be subject to human rights  conditionality~  and a trade, cooperation and investment-
related agreement would in all events contain most of  the elements of  a PCA, except for the political 
dialogue and the political statements in the preamble.  Yet a political dialogue with· Uzbekistan is in 
the EU's interest, not just for the general reasons set out above but also given that country's regional 
importance,  its  proximity to both Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and the productiop of uranium and 
drugs in Uzbekistan itself and in neighbouring regions of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.  The same is 
true of  Turkmenistan, given that country's relationship with Iran and its importance as a creditor o( 
otherNIS. 
16.5  It may be concluded that it would be in the EU's economic and security interests to establish a more 
regular dialogue with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.  It must be recognised that the EU's political 
11 conditionality for negotiating a PCA (i.e. the principles expressed in the CSCE documents) is unlikely 
to be met in the short term.  A regular dialogue will enable the partners concerned to measure the 
progress in meeting the political and economic conditions the European Union attach to negotiating 
and concluding a PCA. 
, 
It follows that EU relations with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan need to be considered in a long-term 
perspective.  On the one hand, a framework is  required for ongoing development of economic links. 
On the other, the Community must intensify dialogue on its political concerns. 
16.6  Until a new agreement can be concluded, contractual relations will continue to be based on the 1989 
Agreement.  The scope of  that Agreement is probably wide enough to allow for discussion on most of 
the topics which  would  be covered  by a  "less ambitious agreement" of the sort envisaged at the 
March 1994 GAC.  It would be  possible to reach joint decisions on trade and indeed  investment-
related matters through the recommendations of  the Joint Committee convened under that Agreement. 
Those recommendations  could  not,  however,  be binding  in  themselves.  They would  have  to  be 
implemented by each party autonomously. 
-"'  The 1989 Agreement could be supplemented by sectoral agreements, as appropriate, 'i.e.  on textiles, 
nuclear trade and possibly dangerous waste. 
16.7  In parallel, the EU should initiate a regular political dialogue.  This would, on the one hand, address 
the issues set out in pa~  12 and 16.4 and on the other, take the form of exploratory discussions in 
which the EU could explain the criteria it would expect to be met by PCA partners.  The criteria are 
those set out in the CSCE documents, and in particular the provisions of  the Paris Charter concerning 
human rights, democracy and the rule of  law.  The EU would make clear its intention to negotiate full 
PCAs once sufficient progress has been achieved  . 
. This dialogue would, perforce, have to be of an informal nature in that it could not take place within 
an institutional framework. 
17.  Political and diplomatic r~lations 
17.1  Eventually,  the  PCAs  will  be the  principal  vehicle  for  political  dialogue  with  the  Central  Asian 
governments.  The only republic without one would be Tajikistan, and here the EU should, in periodic 
discussions with  the Tajik government and meetings  with the Tajik opposition use its  efforts to 
support the peace initiative of  the UN and the OSCE.  Pending the entry into force of PC  As, the EU 
should use the dialogue referred to in para 16.7 to support its overall political objectives 
17.2  OSCE has  also arranged seminars  in  Central Asia aimed at making  opinion  formers  there  better 
acquainted with OSCE principles and commitments, particularly in the areas of  democratic principles 
and the rule of law, and will soon open a Central Asian office in Tashkent to continue an "outreach" 
"programme  concerning  all  aspects  of democratisation.  The  EU  could  actively  support  and 
complement the work of  OSCE as part of  its policy towards Central Asia. 
17.3  Any dialogue with Central Asia should allow the possibility of  a regional dimension. 
17.4  Ongoing discussion with Russia is  a  sine qua non, particularly on energy-related questions and on 
Tajikistan. Such discussion should take place bilaterally and in relevant multilateraj fo(a.  But the EU 
should also consider instituting a  dialogue on Central  Asian matters with Turkey and Pakistan. 
Given that these countries, all five Central Asian republics, Iran and Afghanistan are all members o( 
the  (Islamic)  Economic  Cooperation  Organisation  (ECO)  the  EC  could  also  intensify  existing 
contacts with that organisation. 
12 17.5  Budgetary  means  penruttmg,  the  Commission  will  reflect  on  the  possibility  of increasing  its 
diplomatic  representation,  through  accreditation  of its  Almaty  delegation  and/or  through  the 
eventual  establishment  of a  new  delegation  in  Tashkent.  N.B.  :  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan  and 
Uzbekistan now have embassies in Brussels. 
Conclusions 
18.  The EU's political objectives, particularly relating to human rights and democracy, are ·sophisticated 
and  ambitious~  they can be achieved  only over the long term,  and only  if backed  by a  strong 
European political and economic presence in the region.  The EU needs to raise its profile in Central 
Asia;  it possesses the means to do so.  This does  not imply that the same instruments need to be 
deployed in each of  the new nation states.  The Union's policy towards the region must take account 
of the very different circumstances of the .five  republics.  It could, accordingly,  be based on the 
following lines: 
Economic cooperation and assistance 
a)  With Kyrgyzstan, the PCA should be ratified and the Interim Agreement signed as soon as possible. 
With  Kazakhstan,  implementation  will  need  to  await  ratification,  currently  stalled  due  to  the 
President's suspension of Parliament.  This need not,  however,  prev~nt the negotiation of sectoral 
agreements e.g. on steel and trade in nuclear materials. 
b)  Subject to the  outcome  of needs  assessment,  any new  food  aid  operation  should  again  include 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
c)  Tacis operations should continue in aU  five republics.  These should include the intensification .of 
activities under the Democracy Progranunc, in particular in the two larger republics, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan. 
d)  ECHO should continue to provide humanitarian assistance in ~tral  Asia, subject to needs. 
e)  There is at present no  requirement for the EC to become involved in supporting the ~entral Asian 
republics' external financing.  In the longer run a solution may need to be considered for Tajikistan, 
which has built up substantial arrears on repayment of  interest to the EC. 
New contractual relations 
While it would be  in the EU's economic and security interests to ·establish a more regular dialogue with 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, it must be recognised that the Elfs political conditionality for negotiating a 
PCA (i.e.  the principles expressed in the CSCE documents) is  unlikely to be  met in the short term.  A 
regular dialogue will enable the partners concerned to measure the progress in  meeting the political and 
economic conditions the European Union attach to negotiating and concluding a PCA. 
The EU should therefore initiate a  regular political dialogue.  1bis would, on the one hand, address the 
Union's overall political concerns and on the other, take the form of  exploratory discussions in which the EU 
could explain the criteria it would expect to be  met by PCA  partners.  The EU WOJ.lld  )nake clear its 
intention to negotiate full PCAs once sufficient progress has been achieved . 
. 1bis dialogue would, perforce, have to be of  an informal nature, in that it could not take place within an 
institutional· framework.  In parallel, formal contacts should continue on economic questions, based on the 
1989 Agreement and, as appropriate, sectoral trade agreements.  · 
13 Political dialogue 
The PCAs and the dialogue with  Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan would also  be  the  principal  vehicles  for 
promoting the EU's objectives.  But there should also be a possibility for such dialogue at regional  level. 
The  Union  should  use  its  influence  to  support the  efforts  of the  UN  and  the  OSCE to maintain  the 
momentum of the lnter-Tajik peace process.  Political issues affecting Central Asia,  including Tajikistan 
and access to energy, should be discussed as part of ongoing political contacts with  Russia, Turkey and 
Pakistan,  both bilaterally and  in  multilateral  fora.  In this  context the  EC  could  also  intensify  existing 
contacts with the Economic Cooperation Organisation. 
The Commission will  consider the  possibility of strengthening its diplomatic  representation  in  the  region, 
budgetary means permitting. 
19.  A number ofthe measures referred to above could be the object of  an EU Common Position  . 
*  •  • 
Annex A:  Summary of  the economic situation ofthe republics of  Central Asia 
Annex B:  Summary ofTacis activities in the region 
Annex C:  Situation regarding servicing of  EC loans under the 1250 MECU facility 
Annex D:  The EC's trade with Central Asia 
14 Draft Common Position 
on the obj~ves  and priorities of  the European Union 
towards the Newly IDdependeat States of  Central Asia 
The Commiuioa, in forwarding to the Council a Communication on the totality of  the Bu~  l:Jnion's 
relations with the Newly Iadcpeodent States of  Central Asia, considers it necessary, in paralle1, to propose 
that the Council adopt a Common Position by virtue of  Article J.2 of  the Treaty on European Union COMM:ON POSITION 
defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.l of the Treaty on European Union 
on the objectives and priorities of the European Union towards the Newly 
Independent States of Central Asia 
(95/  ••• CFSP) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular article J  .2. thereof,  -.,. 
SETS OUT THIS COMMON POSITION: 
A.  The European Union  will pursue the following objectives and priorities in  its relations 
with  the  Republics  of  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan  and 
Uzbekistan : 
1.  to support their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
2..  to support the further development of democratic norms and institutions, the promotion 
of human rights and individual liberties and the rule of law; 
In this respect, practical assistance measures, conclusion of contractual relations, advice 
on  legislation  and  assistance  in  establishing  democratic  institutions  through  contacts 
between  officials,  parliamentarians  and  non-governmental  organisations,  as  well  as 
through the monitoring of electoral processes will be pursued; 
3..  to support and complement the work of the UN and the OSCE in  furthering  the peace 
. process in Tajikistan and concerning all aspects of democratisation in the region; 
4.  to promote the process of political economic reform generally; 
5.  to provide humanitarian assistance, including the supply of essential foodstuffs and fuel, 
where this is deemed necessary, in addition to Community operations in these areas; 
6.  to cooperate closely with the international financing institutions, other donors and other 
Independent States concerning  humanitarian  assistance and assistance to  the economic 
development of the region; ·7.  to initiate a regular political dialogue with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in order to discuss 
issues concerning human rights, democracy and the rule oflaw and to measure in particular ' 
the progress  in  meeting the conditions the EU attaches to negotiating and  concluding a 
PCA; 
8.  to support equable solutions regarding access to, and transit for export of, energy 
products; 
9.  to  promote cooperation within multilateral fora,  including the UN,  the OSCE and the 
Energy Charter Conference. 
·  B.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  their  national  policies  conform  to  this  common 
position. 
THE COUNCIL NOTES  that the Community,  on  the basis of Commission's initiatives,  will 
contribute to the above objectives and priorities, in particular through the implementation of the 
PCAs signed with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and through the implementation of the European 
Energy Charter Treaty. 
THE  COUNCIL  WILL  UNDERTAKE  the  necessary  measures  to  promote  the  above 
mentioned objectives, where appropriate on the basis of Commission proposals. 
C.  This common positiiJn shall be published in the Official Journal. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the Council, 
The President, 
tr SUMMARY OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION 
IN THE REPUBLICS OF CENTRAL ASIA 
AnnexA The economic situation of  Kazakhstan 
Until  1994, it seemed that the govenunent was not pursuing a serious cautious approach to the transition 
from  a planned economy  to a rnarlcet-oriented economy.  In  1994,  Kazakhstan  adopted  a comprehensive 
structural reform program. The country has also started a macroeconomic stabilization program with the 
support of  the IMF. 
YJll. bas declined continuously during the past few  years:  After having decreased by  15  percent in  1992 
and by  16 percent in  1993, a decrease of 20 percent in  1994 was  recorded.  Shortages of fuel,  parts and 
material, combined with weakened demand in the CIS-countries, as weU as sharp reductions in Russian oil 
deliveries, on which Kazakh refineries depend  (altho~gh Kazakhstan is an oil exporter), have,.  been the main 
reasons for the sharp output decline. Trade continued to contract sharply with countries of  the CIS. 
Industrial production suffered considerable contractions:  j.p  1992, a decline of 15  percent was  recorded, 
followed by a decline of 16  percent in  1993. In 1994, thcre··was a decrease of 20 percent.  Kazakhstan's 
industry is dominated by mining and processing activities, given the country's rich natural resource bases: 
golc( iron ore, coal, copper, chrome, wolfram, zinc and lead. The pctrolcwn sector plays a pivotal role in the 
economy, accounting for one third of  hard currency exports. Severe trade relations with the CIS-countries, 
which were the main trade partners since 1990, as well as problems with the supply of industrial goods and 
problems with the introduction of new technologies have been the  main  reasons  for  the  sharp  decline  in 
industrial production. 
Agriculture accounts for some 40 percent of  GOP. Kazakhstan is a net exporter of  agricultural. conunoditics 
(particularly grain) to other republics of  the former Soviet Union. Land and other natural resources are state 
properties which cannot be sold to foreigners - leases, however, are allowed. Under the govcnunent's reform 
program, many price controls have been lifted and the share of output which is subject to state orders has 
declined.  · 
The high inflation rate is a major. problem of Kazakhstan's  economy:  in  1992, it reached arate of 1176 
percent, followed by a rate of 1662 percent in 1993 and by 1826 percent in 1994. One of  Kazakhstan's main 
goals is to decrease inflation - for 1995, an inflation rate of 120 percent is expected. In November 1993, the 
national currency, the tenge, was introduced. 
The unemployment Rte is still rising. It is estima'ted that some 20 percent of the active population will be 
out of  a job at the end of 1995. Only a few people receive unemployment benefit. 
Kazakhstan recorded a budgetary deficit of7.3 percent ofGDP in  1992, of 1.2 percent in  1993 and of4.6 
percent in  1994. A deficit of 3.5  percent is expected in  1995. The Government tightened fiscal  policy in 
1994,  primarily through  severe  expenditure cuts.  On  the  revenue  side,  steps  arc being  taken  to further 
eliminate tax exemptions and to improve collections. 
In 1992, there was a trade deficit of US$  11 OOm, followed by a deficit of US$ 438m in 1993 and by US$ 
857m in  1994. 40 percent oftrade is still effected with the CIS-countries. The EU had a tratle deficit with 
Kazakhstan both in 1993 (ECO 340m) and in the first nine months of 1994 (ECU 129m):This reflects trade 
in natural resources, and energy in particular. 
The current ·account showed a deficit of US$  1500m in  1992, of US$ 438m in  1993, and of US$ 995m in 
1994. In 1995, a deficit of  more than US$  lOOOm is expected. 
L'1 Some initial privatization took place between 1991 and early 1993. About 7,00'0 enterprises out of  a total of 
· 48,000 were formally privatized. They represent about 10 percent of  all state-owned assets and 12 percent 
of total employment.  These enterprises were privatized mainly to  workers'  collectives and managers.  A 
National Pri~on  Program for 1993-1995, was started in mid 1993. The economic situation of the Kyrgyz Republic 
The country is  one of the least developed of the NIS.  Despite this,  the Kyrgyz Republic has a 
reputation  for  being  among  the  most  democratic of the  CIS  and  for  having  made  significant 
progress in  economic refonn under very unfavourable circumstances.  After a very  sharp fall  in 
economic activity in the first few years of  reform, 1995 should see the beginnings of  a turnaround. 
Agriculture remains the main  economic activity in  the country although industry accounts for a 
somewhat larger share of  NMP than in the rest of  the region. Major industries include metallurgy, 
machinery,  food  processing,  electronics  and  textiles.  The  Kyrghyz  Republic  has  considerable 
deposits of  certain key minerals, notably coal, but also gold, mercury and uranium, but extraction 
is complicated by the mountainous nature of much of the country's terrain.  T~  cqJJntiy's good 
river resources enable  it  to  produce  significant  amounts  of hydroelectricity,  some  of which  is 
exported. 
The disintegration of  the Soviet payments system and the collapse of  inter-republican trade created 
severe shortage of  inputs for industrial production. The country suffered a serious deterioration in 
its tenns of  trade.  A3 a result, real GOP is understood to have fallen by 5% in  1991, by  19% in 
1992, by 16% in 1993, and by an estimated 5.5% in  1994. The decline in output is expected to be 
reversed in 1995. 
The Kyrgyz Republic's reform efforts date from  1992, when the country's parliament adopted a 
radical programme of  economic reform based on strict monetary and credit control. The intention 
is to reduce inflation from nearly 1,300% in 1993 to a target of 100/o by the end of 1997. Annual 
inflation in 1994 is estimated at just undet 3000/o. Officially measured unemployment has remained 
quite  low  over  the  past  few  years  (only  1.5%  in  1993)  but  it  is  claimed  that  underlying 
unemployment is  around  100/o.  The Kyrgyz Republic's commitment to market-based reform has 
enabled it to mobilize strong international support for its economic programme. By the middle of 
1994, 35% of  industrial enterprises have been privatized. 
Fiscal policy has so far  played only  a nunor role in  the stabilization effort.  However,  under the 
ESAF programme agreed with IMF, the government intends to reduce the budget deficit from 8% 
of GDP  in  1993  to about  3% in  1997.  There have  been  difficulties  on  both  the  revenue  and 
expenditure  sides.  Removing  remaining  direct  and  indirec~  subsidies  will  be  a  key  priority. 
Treasury biU  auctions are increasingly resorted to in  order to fund  the budget deficit.  However, 
reducing the fiscal  deficit  will  also ·have favourable consequences for  the conduct of monetary 
policy. In May 1993, the country• introduced a separate currency, the som. 
The country· continues to run a large external deficit. In 1993, the deficit amounted to 16 per cent 
of GDP. The country has also suffered two severe trade shocks since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Firstly, there has been an_ important deterioration in the Republic's tennr. of  trade as a result 
of  the sharp hike in energy import prices.  Secondly, as a consequence of the disiAtegration of the 
Soviet inter-republican payments system, the country has  experienced both an  acute shortage in 
the supply of much needed imputs from other republics and  a fall  in  demand for  its exports.  In 
1994,  exports  amounted  to  14  per  cent  of GDP,  compared  to  21%  in  1993.  The  external 
indebtedness is projected to rise sharply from 18% ofGDP in  1993 to around 36% in  1997. The 
country's  ability  to  service  this  level  of indebtedness  will  therefore  depend  on  whether  it  can 
1\ increase hard currency earnings from higher exports and on whether it can attract greater inflows 
of  foreign investment.  · 
During 1993 and 1994, there has been a significant growth in trade with the EU. 
Zl. EConomic situation of  Tajikistan 
Tajikistan gained independence in  September  1991  and  the Government  initiated  a  number of 
reforms.  However,  in  1992  and  early  1993,  Tajikistan  endured  a  civil  war fueled  by  clan  and 
regional rivalries.  Economic developments have been heavily  influenced by the war and  internal 
strife,  as  well  as the dislocations associated  with the break-up of the former  Soviet Union,  its 
command economy and its trade and  payments system.  Due to war and  poor national  statistics 
collection .the data on Tajikistan is incomplete or may be distorted . 
Tajikistan's gross domestic product is  estimated to have dropped by  12  percent  in  Jan.-Jun.  of 
1994, preceded by 27 percent decline in  1993,and a decline of30 percent in 1992. In terms of  real 
net material product, the size of  the economy at end-1993 was estimated at about 40 percent of  its 
1988level. 
By August 1994, about 120,000 persons, or 6 percent ofthe economically active population of 1.9 
million,  reportedly  were  without  work.  However, -only  21,500  person~  were  registered  as 
unemployed at end-1993, because of  strict eligibility rules. 
The financial situation is becoming increasingly difficult in the absence of  clearly defined monetary 
arrangements. Monetary and credit policies during 1993  remained geared mainly toward meeting 
the financing demands of  the Government and state-owned enterprises rather than the achievement 
of  macroeconomic targets. 
Pre-1993·rubles  remained  legal  tender until  early  January  1994.  After  th~ Russian  Federation 
withdrew the pre-1993 rubles from circulation in its territory, the Tajik government introduced the 
new Russian ruble as the national currency, without formally  entering into a monetary union with 
Russia. The government obtained in late 1993 a loan on commercial terms of  Rub 120 billion from 
Russia to secure the shipment of  an equal amount of  currency for national circulation. 
Consumer price inflation averaged 32 percent per month during  1993, but it  showed a declining 
trend in beginning 1994. 
During 1993 ·the state budget recorded a deficit 25  percent of GDP. The deficit was fully financed 
by  borrowing  from  the  National  Bank.  This  represented  an  improvement  compared  tq  the 
performance  of  1992  when  the  deficit  had  reached  31 _ percent  of  GDP.  The  moderate 
improvement in the budgetary situation in  1993  reflected a move toward a -more  restrictive fiscal 
stance, which the authorities perceived as a requirement posed by Russia for joining a new ruble 
area. 
Balance of  payments estimates by the IMF indicate a widening of  the current account deficit from 
about USD  53  million  in  1992 to  USD 104  million  {30  percent of GDP)  in  1993.  Estimated 
exports amounted  to USD  452.2  million,  while  imports  were  at  USD  660.3  million  in  1993. 
Almost  all  recorded  trade  was  tightly  controlled  by  agencies  directly  affilia(ed  with  the 
Government.  Most recorded trade with  FSU  states  was  based  on  bilateral  trade  agreements, 
negotiated  by  the  respective  governments  with  prices  at  close  to  world  market  prices.  It is 
estimated, however, that only 30 to 40 percent of  these agreements were fulfilled. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF TuRKMENISTAill 
In tenns of its natural resource base, the Turkmensitan economy is  in a somewhat enviable position 
compared to some of its neighbours in Central Asia. The country is one ofthe world's largest suppliers of 
natural gas and also benefits from significant deposits of  oil. Turkmenistan is also a major producer and 
exporter of  cotton. However, Turkmenistan has experienced severe problems in exploiting its advantages in 
tenns of  natural resources. Pipeline constraints have deprived the country of  its access to Western export 
markets which are crucial if  it is to sell its energy resources at world prices. In addition, other NIS have 
built up substantial payments arrears against Turkmenistan for oil and gas supplies. At the end of 1994, gas 
payments arrears amounted to US$ 1,740 million or 73 per cent of  GOP. 
In 1992, GOP in Turkmenistan declined by around 8 per cent. lbis was substantially less than in the other 
Central Asian countries. In 1993, the economy staged a significant energy-driven recovery as GDP 
increased by around l 0 per cent. The other Central Asian countries experienced further Mls iii output in 
that year. However, 1994 saw a disastrous turnaround in Turkmenistan's fortunes. GOP fell again, by 
around 4 per cent, as natural gas production plununcted by over 40 per cent. Despite the generally 
depressed state of  economic activity in  1994, inflation actually rose fonn 1993's dismal record of I ,500 per 
cent. The annual inflation rate in  1994 is understood to have been in excess of  2,500 per cent, reflecting the 
direct impact of  price adjustments. The introduction of  the new Turkmen currency (the manat) in  1993 was 
to have been the way for the country to de-link itself from the inflationary environment of  the rouble area, 
but has failed so far to usher in a new period of  price stability. 
The Turkmen authorities have nevertheless made rather successful efforts to contain the growth in 
budgetary expenditure in the face of  sharply falling taxation revenues. Thus, whereas the budget deficit has 
been contained to more or less manageable levels, the country has been suffering from acute balance of 
payments difficulties. The increasing imposition of  hard budget constraints in Russia has slashed the 
demand for Central Asian manufactures. At the same time, the Turkmen authorities have taken a number of 
specific measures intended to compress imports and contain the loss of  foreign exchange reserves, The 
medium-tenn balance of  payments outlook is highly uncertain because it will depend heavily on the ability 
ofTurkmenistan's main trading partners to pay for deliveries of  the country's oil and gas exports, as well as 
on the viability of  alternative pipeline routes. 
The country's stock of  external debt is estimated to have risen from US $ 168 million at the end of 1993 to 
US $ 418 million· (or 18 per cent of  GOP) at the end of 1994. The official exchange rate of  the currency (at 
75 manat per US dollar) has been kept at a highly appreciated level relative to the black market level. This 
may reflect a deliberate policy intended to keep import costs at low levels for certain key sectors. 
The process of  transforming the economy into a market-based system began during 1992, with the 
liberalization oftrade and certain key prices and with the introduction of  a series ofmonetary reforms. The 
country now benefits from a relatively liberal environment for foreign investment and the trading regime is 
also quite 9pen. It must be noted, however, that the country has made only limited progress with respect to 
privatization. 
Relations with the EU will be increasingly important as the country tries to develop into a major energy 
supplier. The EU is both a major potential consumer of  energy products and a major supplier<>f investment 
capital, services and equipment. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF UZBEKISTAN 
The breakdown of  traditional trading arrangements among CIS-states and the movement towards world 
market prices, especially for trade in petroleum products, has adversely affected Uzbekistan's trade position. 
The Government has adopted a program of  economic and structural refonns to limit the decline in output 
and trade, modernize institutional and economic structures, and move towards an open and efficient market-
based economy. Direct government price controls on all food items and consumer goods (except certain 
utilities) were removed during 1993-94, and direct budget subsidies for consumer goods were eliminated in 
1994. The national currency, the som, was introduced on July 1,  1994 with a rate of 1:7 per U.S. Dollar. 
In 1992, OO.f decreased by 11%, in 1993 there was a decrease of2,4o/o, and in 1994 a decrease of2,5% 
was recorded. GDP is expected to decrease by a further 4% in 1995. The output decline in Uzbekistan 
continues to be much smaller than in most other countries in the CIS. There are two main factors 
contributing to this perfonnance. First. Uzbekistan's specialisation in the production of  agricultural and 
energy commodities shielded the economy somewhat from the collapse in CIS productiQI:I.ihal was centered 
in the manufacturing sectors. Oil production increased substantially due to the discovery and opening of  a 
new oil field. Second, Uzbekistan was slower than other CIS-countries in removing state orders and 
subsidies. The continued controls helped temporarily in preventing drastic declines in Uzbekistan's economy. 
Industrial production declined by 12% in 1992 and by another 8% in 1993. It is dominated by the extractive 
industries. The gas industry. the coal industry and the petroleum industry represent the most powerful 
sectors. Uzbekistan ranks second among the CIS countries and eight in the world in total gold production. 
The country a~so bas significant deposits of  silver. copper, lead and zinc.  . 
The aaricultyral sector represents about 30% of  GDP, with cotton dominating agricultural production. One 
third of  cotton and grain production. which was not subject to state order, could be sold by farmers at free 
prices, mainly through local governments. This reduces the world prices fanners have to pay for equipment 
and machinery which is imported from Russia. 
The inflation rate in 1992 was 640o/o, it declined to 530% in 1993 and increased to 720% in 1994. In 1995, 
a rate of 140% is expected. During the past three years, inflation bas been a serious macroeconomic 
problem in Uzbekistan, reflecting expansionary monetary policies, wage increases, supply shortages, and 
increases in import input prices, in particular for energy products. The high rate in 1994 is due to the price 
liberalisation, as there are now only a few products subject to price controls. 
It is estimated that of  a total population of22,1 million in 1994, 8,9 million persons are economically active. 
The o~cial unemployment statistics are still very low (4,5%). The real figure is estimated to be much higher 
(about 20%). 
Uzbekistan recorded a budgetary deficit of 18% of  GDP in 1992, but it continued to decline to·l2% in  1993 
and to 3,6% in 1994. In 1995, a deficit of  3,5% is expected. 
In 1992, Uzbekistan bad a trade deficit of  US$ 236m, of US$ 378m in  1993 and in  1994 a surplus of  US$ 
4lm. Trade between Uzbekistan and the EU was in surplus to the amount of ECU 214m in  1993 in favour 
ofthe Central Asian country, and a surplus ofECU 130m was recorded during the first nine months of 
1994. 
The current account still shows a deficit. In 1992, a deficit of 11,8% of  GOP was recorded, in 1993 a deficit 
of9% ofGDP and in 1994 a deficit of9,4% were recorded. In 1995, a drastic decline to 18% of  GOP is 
expected. The current account deficit was more than offset by capital inflows, which allowed Uzbekistan to 
build up its international reserves. In the early stage, the Government's privatization program concentrated on housing and full or partial 
privatization of  small enterprises. The Government is now detennined to address the issue of  privatization 
on medium- and large-scale enterprises. In. the financial sector, the authorities intend to strengthen the 
Central Bank by adopting new central bank legislation. There is still no stock exchange in Tashkent. SUMMARY OF CURRENT TACIS ACTMTIES 
IN CENTRAL ASIA 
Annex B TACIS ACTIVITIES CURRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED IN KAZAKHSTAN 
A total of over 60 million ECU 
Indicative Programmes 
Tacis strategies in Kazakhstan have been manifested in two Indicative Progranunes, the first for 1992 and 
the second for the three year period 1993-95, which prevails to guide the 1995 action progranune 
The initial strategy (April 1992) focused on the local skills and know-how required to accelerate the 
economic refonn process. 
The 1993-95 (current) Tacis strategy narrowed the range of  intended interventions to three of  the critical 
sectors tackled in the 1992 progranune, in order to achieve optimal impact: enterprise restructuring, food, 
and human resources.  Where possible, sectoral concentration is combined with geographic focus. 
The overall objectives continue the 1992 emphasis on the upgrading of  local skills and tlterdissemination of 
the know-how required in all sectors of  the economic refonn process. 
Actions are intended to support Kazakhstan in undertaking economic and sectoral reforms and progressing 
towards political democracy, with Government playing a key role in the selection of  activities. 
For the focal sector, Enterprise Restructuring &  Development, co-operation is directed to support: 
•  privatisation and restructuring of  enterprises, 
•  promotion of  the development or'newly-privatised small and medium-sized enterprises, 
•  improvement and modernisation of  financial services 
In Food Production, Processing &  Distribution, the 1993-95 programme aims to support: 
•  institutional and policy reforms, specifically in land reform, 
•  production and distribution of  agricultural equipment, inputs and outputs for the private fanners. 
Human Resource Development, the third sector comprises support for: 
•  training of  officers in the public administration; 
•  upgrading the teaching of  economics and management; 
•  further refonn of  the public administration, management ofthe public investment progranune, policy and 
legal advice to Government. 
Action Programmes 
Prior to the break-up of  the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan benefited from a share of  the 400 MECU Tacis 
programme for the whole NIS, which was directed to five broad sectors: management training, financial 
services, food distribution, energy and transport.  Under the 1991 programme total grants of 10.86 MECU 
supported initiatives in Kazakhstan, including national actions in training, food distribution and energy 
(listed below) and inter-republican actions in management education and financial services. 
Three national Action Programmes have been elaborated within the scope of  the agreed outline strategy, the 
first in July 1992 (20.60 MECU), the second in 1993 (14.00 MECU) and the third in 1994 (14.00 MECU). 
A fourth covering 1995 was negotiated in March 1995 for Tacis Conunittee consideration in July 1995.The 
following sections summarise the approved Action Progranunes, classified by sector, with year of  approval'. Entemrise restructurina & DmJomnent  Total  +/- 20 MECU 
Pl'ivalisation 
Privatisalion (notably support fortbe Mus Privatiwticm Programme;- 3.15 MECU (1992). 
ln~tttutto111 lmple11W1111f1Mtl81 PriwlttltltiDit ProgrtlllfN (State Conunittee for Property (GKI) 
0.90 MECU; aDd State Privatilatiaa FUDd (GPF) 1.10 MECU  - 2.00 MECU ( 1993). 
Altti-Monopoly Commt111011 (policy aad leplEvice)  0.35 MECU ( 1993). 
Newly-Prlvatts1d UU.rpriHa (technirti "MiitafttO! to improve efficiency of  restructuring-investment funds 
ill supportiDg ncwly-privatilecl eaterprila)  - O.S9 MECU (1993). 
Stall Commtnee for State PropBty (GKI) ll1llll SID,. PrlWittsation Flllfti (GPF) (advice, assistance  _with 
cue-by-cue priV'tilatian of,fbur furtbereatlrprilel)  ,  - 1.80 MECU (1994). 
Post-PriWJtisatton Suppon (mcludiaa Aktyubilllk ft8ion;  - 2.50 MECU ( 1994). 
Small qndMttltwn Entgrll« lJMlqpMtt 
BJUtMSs ConummiCDtiOIU CflttN ( Ablttlly BCC)  - 6.75 MECU (1992). 
Ent.rprlH Support FWJd (IIIIKMdiaa ml  tldlnnlnsY uailtaDce)  - l.3S MECU (1993):-'  • 
Advlaory Department wtthhr BrulltfU CD~  Centre (Almaty; production and maaagemCnt 
iaformatioa, ccnsultaDeyiDd bui"NN traiaiDa actworb, trainina)- 0.4S MECU (1993). 
lMtitutton-Butlding and  Policy A.tJvlt» (policy advice for Coaarea• of  Entrepreneurs, SME development 
agency inAktyubialk; aad UliltaDceto BCC)  - 1.40 MECU (1994). 
Cont~tNrctal  Bank Trai11ing  {i~Hxud:ry  lbort counes)  - 2.20 MECU (1992). 
Ctntral Btmk Drlelop,.,  (Natioaal Blak of  Kazalcbstan; traiDiDg of  supervisors, advice reprdiDg 
paymeats and c1eariaa l)'lteml)  • O.SO MECU (1992). 
Advitory Sttrvlcu for C01r11MI'CUil ~  {Service Bureau Network (SBN) providing practical and direct 
baDking advice)  • 1.80 MECU (1993). 
Commucial Banldng (advisory service~ to baDks ill  Aktyubiask; usiltance to Kazakhstan Association of 
BaDkers)  -0.60 MECU (1994). Food processing. production and distribution  Total  +/- 20 MECU 
Milk, Meat,  Fresh Produce and Animal Feed Sectors  - 1.40 MECU (1991). 
Advice to Government on Agriculture  -0.80 MECU (1992). 
Food Distribution System  - 1.50 MECU (1992). 
Pilot Project for Small-Scale Private and Co-operative Farmers  - 1.50 MECU ( 1992). 
Pilot Development of  Private Farming and Food and Food Processing  -2.10 MECU (1993). 
Farm and Agro-Jndustrial Machinery and Equipment  - 1. 05 MECU ( 1993 ). 
Reorganisation of  Food Processing and Distribution  - 1.80 MECU ( 1994  ). 
Agricultural Pilot Projects  - 1.35 MECU (1994). 
Human resources deyclcmmegt  Total  +/- 15 MECU 
Ki:lzakhstan Institute of  Management and Economics, MBA  {KIMEP)  - 2.00 MECU (1991). 
Training Programme for Young Entrepreneurs  -1.60 MECU (1991). 
Advice to Government on Macroeconomics  - 3.00 MECU (1992). 
Higher Education Reform  -0.70 MECU (1992~  • 
KazDkh State Academy of  Management (KDzGAU)  -3.15 MECU (1993). 
Public Administration  -1.48 MECU (1994). 
Social Protection Restructuring (Aktyubinsk);  - 1.80 MECU (1994). 
Modernisation of  Customs &rvices (advice)  -0.58 MECU (1994) 
Energy sector  Total  +/- 5 MECU 
Assistance to Kazakhstanenergo 
Ermakovskay Power Station 
Advice to Government on Energy Seftor 
Energy Institute 
Networks 
Advice to Government on Transport Sector 
Advice to Government on Communications Sector 
Reserve and monitoring 
-0.40 MECU (1991). 
- 0.30 MECU (1991}. 
- 0.80 MECU (1992). 
-3.20 MECU (1992). 
Total  +/- 2 MECU 
- 1.20 MECU (1992). 
- 0.60 MECU (1992). 
Total  +/- 2.5 MECU 
0.28 MECU (1994) has been made available for Monitoring & Evaluation ofthe national programme. 
Further allocations of 1.40 MECU (1993) and 0.84 MECU (1994) are available as Contingency Reserves. Tempus 
In 1994 the Tempus-Tacis progranune was started in Kazakhstan. to assist universities in introducing 
necessary refonns in curricula and university management and to refonn the higher education system at 
large. 
Inter state  progranunes 
In addition to the three national Action Progranunes, Kazakhstan has had access to the 28.63 MECU 
Regional (Inter-State) Programme (1992) for actions mvolving more than two states in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, particularly: Government Advice (macnHlCODOI11ic policy, economic decision-making in key 
sectors, and specific policy advice on important sectors); Support for Enterprises (technical assistance and 
business development support); Networb (transport; air traffic control, telecommunications, oil and gas 
pipelines); Economic Reform (payments and clearing systems for central banks); and Water and Cotton 
(water management, environmental concerns and iustainable agriculture).  · 
Similarly, Kazakhstan has bad the opportunity to draw on the 72.00 MECU Inter-state Programme (1993), 
including further actions involving two or more States and facilities or joint instruments'"VO!licB. provide for 
similar actions to be supported in parallel, if  requested, in several republics.  Components of  relevance to 
Kazakhstan include: Partnership in Enterprise (expertise and exchange programmes); Financial Services 
Development (banking); Environmental Aspects of  economic refonn; Water Resources; Transport 
(following May 1993 TRACECA conference, and including air traffic control) and Telecommunications 
(development of  regional networks); Energy (system operation planning and regional electricity use); Legal 
and Policy Advice; support for the development of  the Democratic Structures and Practices; Language 
Training; Customs, Statistics and Economics; Twinning; and information/training Seminars on 
international agreements concerning trade. TACIS ACTIVITIES CURRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED IN KYRGYZSTAN 
A total of over 10 million ECU 
Indicative Programmes 
Tacis strategies in Kyrgyzstan have been manifested in two Indicative Programmes, the first for  1992 and 
the second for the three-year period 1993-95, which prevails to guide the  1995 action progranune 
The initial strategy (April 1992) focused on the local skills and know-how required to accelerate the 
economic reform process. The 1993-95 Tacis strategy (January 1994) narrowed the current range of 
intended interventions to three of-the critical sectors tackled in the 1992 programme: food, ener&Y and 
human resources. 
For the focal sector, Food Production, Processina & Distribution, co-operation is directed to support: 
•  the reform process in the sector, in particular: land reform, appropriate crop selection, the organisation 
of  private farms; agricultural inputs, and fanner services (extension, research and crettft);""' 
•  the rationalisation and technical improvement of  the livestock sub-sector; and 
•  the privatisation and reorganisation of  the wholesale and retail trade for agricultural commodities, 
including the development of  city markets. 
For the Enerc sector, the 1993-95 programme aims to support: 
•  the establishment of  an Energy Centre as an institutional focal point for energy initiatives such as the 
development of  a market-oriented energy policy, the promotion of  local energy production and energy 
savings, and training. 
Human Resource Development, the third sector selected for the 1993-95 programme, comprises support 
to: 
•  reform of  the public administration, 
•  skills development in management, and economics,  _ 
•  upgrading the process of  policy formulation through appropriate advice to government and public 
institutions an4 assistance with the legislation needed in a market economy. 
Action Programmes 
Prior to the declaration of  Independence in August 1991, Kyrgyzstan benefited from a small share ofthe 
initial 400 MECU Tacis 1991 progra.nune for the whole NIS.  Actions included Advice on Energy (laws, 
privatisation and contracting) - 0.06 MECU; Restoration Concepts for Uranium Mill Tailings -
0.20 MECU; and Public Investment Management Programme (public sector investments and institutional 
reforms)- 0.30 MECU.  In October 1992, an EC Aid Co-ordination Unit was established in Bishkek. 
Three national Action Programmes have been elaborated within the scope of  the agreed outline strategies, 
the first in July 1992 (9.23 MECU) and the second in January 1994 (10.00 MECU).  The third was 
negotiated in January 1995, and is scheduled for consideration by the Tacis Committee in }Jay 1995. The 
following  s~tions present the first two programmes together, classified by sector, with year of  approval. 
Fooci processing. production and distribution  Total  +/-7 MECU •  Sectoral Support to the Ministry of  Agriculture (advice on the establishment of  private farms -
2.81  MECU (1992) .. 
•  Assistance for Improvement of  Private Livestock Sector (production and incomes for breeders) -
2.20 MECU (1993). 
•  Assistance for Supplying Agricultural Inputs and Services to Private Farmers  1.80 MECU ( 1993). 
Energy sector 
•  Energy Policy and Strategies 
•  Energy and Electricity Law 
•  Legal Support for Energy Sector 
•  Management Training in Energy Sector 
•  Energy Saving in But/dings 
Human resources development 
Total  +/- 4 MECU 
1.50 MECU (1992). 
0.30 MECU (1992). 
0.66 MECU (1993). 
1.08 MECU (1993). 
0.66 MECU (1993). 
Total  +/-7 MECU 
•  Government Policy Advice (on labour legislation, private enterprise promotion, and !!!fCrQ-«<nomic 
analysis, support for GOSCOMINVEST)  1.00 MECU (1992). 
•  Privatisation Advice  0.12 MECU (1992). 
•  Public Administration and Civil Service Reform  1.00 MECU (1992). 
•  Social Insurance Reform  3.80 MECU: 
•  Language Training  1.00 MECU (1993). 
Tempus 
In 1994 the Tempus-T:1eis progranune was started in Kyrgyzstan with two projects, to assist universities in 
introducing necessary refonns in curricula and university management and to reform the higher education 
system at large. 
Reserve and monitorin& 
Monitoring and Evaluation and as a Contingency Reserve  1.00 MECU (1993) 
Inter-state programmes 
In addition to the two national Action Programmes, Kyrgyzstan has bad access to the 28.63 MECU 
Regional (Inter-State) Programme (1992) for actions involving more than two states in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia.  Provision has included: Govemment Advice (macr<H:Canomics policy, economic decision-
making, and specific policy advice on important sectors); Economic reform {payments and clearing systems 
for central banks); Support for Entsrprises (technical assistance and business development support,  · 
involving four finns in Tokmak and Bisbkek); Transport (Air Traffic Control at Manas Airport) and 
Telecommunications (Master Study and Action Plan). 
Similarly, Kyrgyzstan bas had the opportunity to draw on the Inter-State Programme (1993), including 
further actions involving two or more states and {acilities or joint instruments which provide for similar 
actions to be supported in parallel, if  requested, by several republics. 
Components of  relevance to Kyrgyzstan include: Partnership in Enterprise (expertise and ex"hange 
programmes, to improve SME skills through work attachments); Financial Services (Central·Asian 
Accounting and Auditing {0.20 MECU), to improve the legal and regulatory framework; banking advice; 
bank twinning; and training, through the Regional Bank Training Centre ( 1.50 MECU) in Tashkent since 
early 1994 for bankers from Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan); Environment Aspects of  Economic 
Reform;  Water Resource Management and Agricultural Production in the Central Asian Republics 
(management and institutional structures for water resources in the Aral Sea Basin- 4.80 MECU); Transport (follow-up to the May 1993 TRACECA Conference (transport corridor, legal framework and 
information system); and Transport and Distribution of  Natural and Low Concentrate Uranium in the CIS 
- 0.50 MECU);) and Teleco'!'munications (development of regional networks). 
Also benefiting Kyrgyzstan are: Regional Oil and Gas Management (law, organisation, technology, co-
operation, management training- 4.00 MECU) and Regional Electricity Sector Programme (planning, 
control, distribution, organisation; Legal and  Policy Advice; the Democracy Programme; Language 
Training; Customs, Statistics and Economics (training, advice and customs computerisation feasibility 
study); Mercure (bilateral visits of  Chambers of  Commerce); Town Twinning; and information/training 
Seminars on international agreements concerning trade. TACIS ACTIVITIES CURRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED IN UZBEKISTAN 
. A total of over 35 miHion ECU 
Indicative Programmes 
Tacis strategies in Uzbekistan have been manifelted in two Indicative Programmes, the first for  1992 8lld 
the second for the three year period 1993-95, which prevails to guide the 1995 action programme. 
' 
The 1993-95 (current) Tacis strategy (May 1994) narrowed the current range of  intended interventions to 
three of  the critical seCtors tackled in the 1992 programme, in order to achieve optimal impact: hwnan 
resources, enterprise reform and food 
For the focal sector, Huaaia Resources Developmeat, co-operation is directed to support: 
•  education in the manapment of  a marbt«iwted economy, with emphasis on the retraining of 
medium- and high-level administrators; 
•  streagtheDiDg the effeetiveneu of  public JeCtor staff involved in policy preparation and implementation, 
in particular those responsible for hiaher education and employment; and 
•  the development of  social security systems. 
In Enterprile Restructurina and Developmeat. the 1993-95 programme aims to support: 
•  the devclopi11Cilt of  SMEs as one of  the mecbaDisms for development of  a free market economy; 
•  the restructuring and privatisation of  state enterprises, includiDg industry and agriculture; and 
•  tlJe development of  fiDancial institutions, both public and private, including banks related to foreign 
trade. 
Food Production, ProcesJina aaci DiJtributioa, the third sector selected for attention in the 1993-95 
programme, comprises support for: 
•  diversification of  aaficultural production from cotton, to reduce food imports and encourage exports; 
•  development of  the food processina and packaging sector using traditional and new crops, for both 
domestic consumption and export; and  · 
•  developing export transport capacities and marketing/sales strategies for neighbouring countries and 
emerging markets.  ' Action Programmes 
Prior to the break-up of  the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan benefited from a share of  the 1991 budget 
400 MECU Tacis programme for the whole NIS, which was directed to five broad sectors: management 
training, energy, transport, food distribution and financial services.  Under the 1991 programme, 
1.00 MECU was assigned for initiatives in Uzbekistan in Transport (Study ofTashkent Airport- 0.30 
MECU) and Food Production and Distribution (Dairy and  fresh produce, privafisation of  Sovkozes, and 
food wholesale and retail system in Tashkent- 0.70 MECU). 
Two Action Programmes have been approved within the scope of  the agreed outline strategy, the first in 
June 1992 (18.78 MECU)  and the sec:ond in February 1994 (15.00 MECU). The following sectio~ present 
these first two aatioaal programmes together, classified by sector, with brief  commentary, grant, and year of 
approval. A third, tccal1ing 10 MECU, was negotiated  in Marcb.l995, and will be tabled before the June 
Tacis MaDapmcDt Committee.  . 
( 
Human resources dmlopment 
•  Macro-economic Policy Advice to Govemment 
•  Management Training 
•  Assistance to the Employment Services 
•  Market Sldlls Development Centre 
•  Restructuring of  Local Govemment (Syrdaria) 
•  Centre of  Law for Entrepreneurs  · 
•  Support to Industrial Property Protection 
Ente~risc  restructuring iU1d deyelomnent 
•  Advisory Services to Commtnee on Prlvattsatton 
•  Advise to the Supreme Soviet 
•  Business Communications Centre 
•  Establishment of  SME Development 
•  Assistance to UZGOSFUND 
•  Committee for State Property Management advice 
•  Restructuring of  the Financial Sector 
Food production. processing and distribution 
•  Support for Private Farmers,Sydaria 
•  Assistance to Private Distribution Sector 
•  Food and Agriculture Policy Advisory Unit 
•  Pilot Integrated Development Project 
Energy sector 
•  Advice to Govemment on Energy Sector 
•  Electricity Sub-sector (management training) -
•  Oil and Gas Sub-sector (seminar and trainiiig) 
•  Energy Saving 
Transport 
•  Aviation 
•  Urban Transport 
Total  +/- 12 MECU 
2.00 MECU (1992). 
2.23 MECU (1992). 
1.28 MECU (1992). 
3.90 MECU (1993-94). 
1.5 MECU (1993-94). 
0.40 MECU (1993-94). 
0.40 MECU (1993-94). 
Total +/- 6 MECU 
0.79 MECU (1992). 
1.23 MECU (1992). 
0.29 MECU (1992). 
1.80 MECU (1993-94). 
0.40 MECU (1993-94). 
0.60 MECU (1993-94). 
0.90 MECU (1993-94). 
Total  +/- 7 MECU 
1.55 MECU (1992). 
1.45 MECU (1992). 
1.70 MECU (1993-94). 
2.00 MECU (1993-94). 
Total +/- 6 MECU 
1.00 MECU (1992). 
1.40 MECU (1992). 
1.73 MECU (1992). 
2.15 MECU (1992). 
Total +/- 2 MECU 
0.98 MECU (1992). 
0.70 MECU (1992). Teropus 
•  In 1994,  the Tempus -Tacit  propamme was ltaMd in Uzbekistan. in order to assist univenities in 
introducing the reforms in curricula aDd biper education maaagement. Presently six such projects are 
rwmiDs in Tashkent and Samarbnd. 
A fUrther allocation of 1.40 MECU (1993-94) is available for Monitoring and Evaluation and as a 
Continpncy &nrve. 
In additim to tbe two natioMI Actioll Proplmmel, ~stan  bu  bid access to the 28.63 MBCU 
JUsioaal' Pqramrile (1992), particularly: Polk:y Atl\llt», T1Yl1Uport (Caucuua-Ceatral Asia triDiit routes). 
Tel6colfUIIUIIiCDtiOIU (Mutllr Study aacl AdD! PIID), Cotton Gl't1WIItg (nlltnlc:turiDg to optimal pattem), 
WaN~'  /Wourc. MtmtzpiiiMt (ltady), aDd &mk  Trahllng (Resioaa1 Blllki"'' llld FiDancc ScboQl at 
~-.  ~· 
Similarly, UzbekistaD hu  bad the opportuaity to draw oo tba 72.00 MBCU Inter-state Programme (1993), 
iDduding-projects in Tlmvport (followiaa 1993 'I'RACBCA coafereace), T•lecommunJcatton.J (reaional 
.aetworb), EMrgy (resional cJectricity aetWodcl). aDd EIMI"'OffffMt and Wm.r Resources.  Other 
"Faciliticl" coveriaa support far the~  i~  ecoaomic leCtOr include: ''Partnuahtp in 
El.terprlseH, financial services dewlopmeot.llpliDd policy advice, 1usuaae training, customs and 
statistic~, eaviroammtal upeca of  OCOIIOIIIic reform. IDd support for the development of  democratic 
ltrUCblra and practices. TACIS PROJECI'S CURRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED IN TAnKISTAN5 
- a total of  3.6 million ECU 
1.  FOOD PRODUCTION, PROCESSING AND DISTRlBtmON 
•  Establishment of  a Strategy and Planning Advisory Unit for Agriculture - 1. 6 MECU ( 1994) 
(Under tender). 
2.  HUMAN REsoURCES DEVELOPMENT 
•  Support for Economics and Management ~raining- 1.0 MECU (1994) (Under ~ender). 
3.  ENERGY 
.  ..  . 
•  Global Strategy Plan in Energy- 1.0 MECU (1994) (Under tender). 
- 'S 
4.  Tajikistan has also benefited or will benefit from a number of projects under the 1991-1995 
Regional (INTER-STATE) Programmes. 
S.  The programming mission for the 1995 Action Prognmme took place in March and resulted 
in the identification of projects to the value of a  further 4 minion ECU in the following 
priority  sectors:  Food  Production,  Processing  and  Distribution;  Human  Resources 
Development~  and Energy. 
5 ( 1994) = date of  Action Programme TACIS PROJECTS CURRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED IN TURKMENISTAN6 
-a total of nearly 16 million ECU 
1.  FOOD PRODUCTION, PROCESSING AND DISlRlBUTION- TOTAL 8.05 MECU 
•  Privatisation in agricultural sector- 0.9 MECU (1991) 
•  Planning and Technical Advisory Unit in Ministry of  Agriculture- 3.8 MECU (1992) 
•  Improvement of  cereal production- 1.5 :MECU (1993) 
•  Fanners• Agricultural Advisory service- 1.85 MECU (1993) 
2.  ENTERPRISE REsTRUcnJRING AND DEVELOPMENT- TOTAL 1.88 MECU 
•  Accounting and auditing assitance- 0.45 :MECU (1991) 
•  Assistance to the Chamber of  Commerce- ~).1 MECU (1992) 
•  Privatisation  policy advice- 0.47 MECU (1992)  -.,. 
•  Management advice and services &cility for enterprises- 0.95 MECU (1993) 
•  SME development agency- 1 MECU (1993) 
3.  HUMAN RESOURCES DEvm.oPMENT-TOTAL 1.8 MECU 
•  Economics and management training development- 1.8 MECU (1993) 
•  Trainirig of  civil servants- 0.99 :MECU (1992) 
4.  ENERGY- TOTAL 1 MECU 
•  Energy advisory group- 1 MECU (1992) 
5.  TRANSPORT AND TELEcOMMUNICATIONS- TOTAL 1 MECU 
•  Advice and training to Railways Department- 0.5 MECU (1992). 
•  Advice to the Ministry of  Communications- 0.5 MECU {1992) 
6.  Turkmenistan has also benefited or will benefit from a number of  projects under the 1991  - 1995 
Regional (INTER-STATE) Programmes. 
7.  The programming mission for the 1995 Action Programme took place in March and resulted in 
the identification of  projects to the value of a further 4 million ECU in the following priority 
sectors:  Food  production  processing  and  development;  Enterprise  restructuring  and 
development;  and Human resources developJDent. 
6 (1992 I 3) =date of  Action Programme Annex C 
1250 MECU loan 
These loans are part of  an exceptional credit line established by the Council of  Ministers in December 1991 
for the  Republics of the  fonner  USSR.  The objective  of the  credit line  is  to assist  in  supplying  the 
population with the most essential food and medical products. 
(in mecu) 
Initial  Actual  1) Capital  Arrean on interest 
entitlement  allocation  repayment schedule  repayments (as of 
2/5/95) 
Kazakhstan  ss  25  15/1/96  .  -
... 
Kyrgyzstan  32  23.7  20/8/95  -
Tajikistan  ss  ss  20/8/95  7.49  2) 
Turkmenistan  49  4S  20/8/95  -
Uzbekistan  129  59  28/9/97  -
KaZakhstan and Turkmenistan still owe very small quantities outstanding due to late payment of  interest. 
1>  The entire loans arc due to be paid on the date shown 
2>  dates of payment:  Tajikistan:  20/10/93,  20/4/94,  20/10/94, 20/4/95 Annex D 
Trade beJween the EU and the guntJip of  Centnl Asia 
(*)  1st sem.  2ndsem.  1st sem.  1993  1994 
1993  1993  1994  lOmonths 
Kazakhstan  I  129.8  162.6  173.8  292.4  233.8 (- 8%) 
'  E  263.4  360.3  354.3  623.7  584.2 (+21%) 
B  + 133.6  + 197.7  + 180.5  + 331.3  +350.4 
-
Turkmenistan  I  48.1  85.4  119.0  133.5  1~9.(+'n%) 
E  46.6  69.5  73.9  116.1  129.1 (+54%) 
B  - 1.5  - 15.9  -45.1  -17.4  - 38.8 
Uzbekistan  I  210.6  205.1  202.5  415.7  449.5 (+16%) 
E  100.0  101.2  187.5  201.2  300.2 (+82%) 
B  - 110.6  - 103.9  -15.2  -214.5  - 149.3 
Tajikistan  I  15.4  37.6  49.9  53.0  77.0  (+77%) 
E  34.6  18.4  20.0  54.0  33.2  (-29%) 
B  + 19.2  -19.2  -29.9  + 1.0  -43.8 
Kyrgyzstan  I  3.7  3.4  6.0  7.1  17.4 (+200%) 
E  5.5  20.7  18.3  26.2  38.7 (+106%) 
B  + 1.8  + 17.3  + 17.7  + 19.1  + 21.3 
Central Asia  I  407.6  494.1  551.2  901.7  945.6  . 
E  450.1  570.1  654.0  1020.  (+200/0) (1) 
B  +42.5  +76.0  + 102.8  + 118.5  1085.4 
(+36%)(2) 
+ 139.8 
I : EU Imports - E : EU E:s.ports - B : EU Balance 
1) 5.6 %of  total EC imports from the ll  NIS. 
2) 8.S% of total EC exports to the 12 NIS. 
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